September 17, 2023, 5:35pm ET
Click on right here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is up to date each day alongside the static maps current on this report.
Click on right here to entry ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces each day by exhibiting a dynamic frontline. ISW will replace this time-lapse map archive month-to-month.
Be aware: The info cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on September 17. ISW will cowl subsequent experiences within the September 18 Russian Offensive Marketing campaign Evaluation.
Ukrainian forces liberated Klishchiivka, south of Bakhmut, on September 17 and continued profitable offensive operations elsewhere within the Bakhmut route. Geolocated footage posted on September 17 reveals Ukrainian forces holding up flags in Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[1] Ukrainian Jap Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash later confirmed that Ukraine has liberated Klishchiivka, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky congratulated the Ukrainian eightieth Air Assault Brigade, fifth Assault Brigade, ninety fifth Air Assault Brigade, and Nationwide Police “Lyut” Assault Brigade for his or her function in liberating the settlement.[2] Additional geolocated footage posted on September 16 reveals that Ukrainian forces have captured positions east of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest of Bakhmut).[3] The liberation of Klishchiivka, in addition to continued Ukrainian tactical positive aspects northwest of Bakhmut, are tactical positive aspects of strategic significance as a result of they’re permitting Ukrainian forces to repair a substantial portion of Russian airborne (VDV) parts within the Bakhmut space, as ISW’s Daniel Mealie discusses within the September 17, 2023 particular version.
Russian forces launched one other collection of Shahed-131/136 drone and cruise missile strikes at southern Ukraine on the night time of September 16-17. The Ukrainian Normal Workers reported that Russian forces launched six Shahed drones from the southeastern and southern instructions and 10 Kh-101/555/55 air-launched cruise missiles from 9 Tu-95MS strategic bombers that took off from Engels Airbase, Saratov Oblast.[4] Ukrainian Air Power Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat famous that Russian forces primarily focused grain infrastructure in southern Odesa Oblast, and Ukrainian navy sources said that Ukrainian forces shot down six Shaheds and 6 cruise missiles.[5] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command posted photos of the aftermath of 1 Russian strike in an unspecified a part of Odesa Oblast.[6] Russian forces moreover struck civilian enterprises in Kharkiv Metropolis with 4 S-300 missiles.[7]
North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un concluded his journey to Russia on September 17 and acquired a number of items of navy technical gear from the governor of Primorsky Krai. Kremlin newswire TASS reported that Kim visited the Far Jap Federal College on September 17, the place he met with Russian navy engineers.[8] TASS and different Russian sources moreover famous that Primorsky Krai Governor Oleg Kozhemyako gifted Kim a navy vest, an unspecified loitering munition, and an unspecified long-range reconnaissance drone.[9] ISW beforehand reported that Russia could also be open to types of technological and defensive cooperation with North Korea however is unlikely to supply bodily techniques resulting from Russian fears that offering the North Korean regime with such techniques could set off additional sanctions towards Russia.[10] It’s due to this fact notable {that a} Russian official gifted Kim with items of navy know-how that can presumably return to North Korea with Kim. United Nations sanctions specify that ”All Member States are required to forestall the direct or oblique provide, sale, or switch to the DPRK, by means of their territories or by their nationals, or utilizing their flag vessels or plane, and whether or not or not originating of their territories, of all arms and associated materiel, together with small arms and light-weight weapons…”[11]
South Korean President Yoon Suuk-Yeol said that Russian and North Korean navy technical agreements could violate sanctions adopted by the UN Safety Council.[12] Yoon said that if details about these agreements is confirmed then this can be a violation of the sanctions and unlawful.[13] The warfare in Ukraine has reportedly generated a fast progress in South Korean arms exports as South Korea replenishes Western shares of ammunition and techniques that the West has despatched to Ukraine.[14] South Korea has not but instantly equipped deadly safety help to Ukraine.[15]
The Russian Ministry of Protection’s (MoD) effort to subsume the Wagner Group is prompting Russian officers to extra brazenly again navy juntas in West Africa. A Russian navy delegation, together with Russian Deputy Protection Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and Major Army Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Normal Andrei Averyanov, arrived in Bamako, Mali on September 16.[16] Yevkurov reportedly met with the Burkinabe, Nigerien, and Malian protection ministers; Malian junta head Assimi Goita; and Burkinabe junta head Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba.[17] Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso signed a safety pact on September 16 promising to come back to one another’s support within the case of any revolt or exterior aggression.[18] The Russian navy delegation’s assembly with the political and navy management of the three junta governments earlier than the signing of the settlement probably signifies that Russian officers are ready to extra explicitly help these juntas. Russia has beforehand used the Wagner Group to forge relationships with the junta governments, however the Russian MoD’s efforts to subsume Wagner’s belongings and operations in West Africa have eradicated the implausible deniability that Wagner beforehand afforded the Russia authorities. Yevkurov and Averyanov seem like closely concerned within the efforts to subsume Wagner, and their participation within the delegation means that they’re probably utilizing to the seizure of Wagner belongings and operations to forge new agreements and partnerships with the junta governments.[19]
Extended concern about Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s well being within the Russian data house highlights Russian President Vladimir Putin’s dependence on Kadyrov for continued stability in Chechnya. The Ukrainian Major Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reportedly confirmed that Kadyrov was in a coma on September 15, prompting rumors about Kadyrov’s poor well being amongst Russian milbloggers and insider sources.[20] Kadyrov denied the rumors about his well being in a video posted on September 17.[21] The destabilization of Kadyrov’s rule in Chechnya could be a serious blow to Putin’s regime, partially due to how central the institution of stability in Chechnya by means of a brutal and bloody warfare was to Putin’s early reputation in Russia. Kadyrov and different Russian officers could also be involved that continued rumors about his well being will have an effect on the long-term stability of his, and by extension Putin’s, management of Chechnya.
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces liberated Klishchiivka, south of Bakhmut, on September 17 and continued profitable offensive operations elsewhere within the Bakhmut route.
- Russian forces launched one other collection of Shahed-131/136 drone and cruise missile strikes at southern Ukraine on the night time of September 16-17.
- North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un concluded his journey to Russia on September 17 and acquired a number of items of navy technical gear from the governor of Primorsky Krai.
- The Russian Ministry of Protection’s (MoD) effort to subsume the Wagner Group is prompting Russian officers to extra brazenly again navy juntas in West Africa.
- Extended concern about Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s well being within the Russian data house highlights Russian President Vladimir Putin’s dependence on Kadyrov for continued stability in Chechnya.
- Russian forces carried out offensive operations alongside the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, close to Bakhmut, alongside the Avdiivka-Donetsk Metropolis line, and within the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast space on September 17 and superior in some areas.
- Ukrainian forces additionally continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
- Latest Russian claims that small contingents of former Wagner Group personnel are returning to battle in Ukraine don’t point out {that a} totally reconstituted Wagner preventing power will return to Ukraine anytime quickly if ever.
- Russian occupation administrations proceed to forcibly deport Ukrainian kids to Russia and erase Ukrainian cultural id.
We don’t report intimately on Russian warfare crimes as a result of these actions are well-covered in Western media and don’t instantly have an effect on the navy operations we’re assessing and forecasting. We are going to proceed to guage and report on the results of those felony actions on the Ukrainian navy and the Ukrainian inhabitants and particularly on fight in Ukrainian city areas. We totally condemn these Russian violations of the legal guidelines of armed battle, Geneva Conventions, and humanity though we don’t describe them in these experiences.
- Russian Major Effort – Jap Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate foremost efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Power Technology Efforts
- Actions in Russian-occupied areas
Russian Major Effort – Jap Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the rest of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into jap Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
The Ukrainian Normal Workers reported that Russian forces are conducting diversionary actions close to the worldwide border to repair Ukrainian forces in border areas and stop them from deploying to different instructions.[22] The Ukrainian Normal Workers added that Russian forces are growing the density of the mine-explosive barrier alongside the border in Belgorod Oblast. A Russian milblogger claimed that artillery and occasional fight engagements happen close to Strilecha (25km northeast of Kharkiv Metropolis) on the worldwide border.[23]
Russian forces continued offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna frontline on September 17 and made restricted territorial positive aspects southwest of Kreminna.[24] Geolocated footage printed on September 17 indicated that Russian forces made slight advances south of Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna).[25] Ukrainian Jap Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash said that Russian forces try to regroup alongside the Kupyansk-Svatove line following failures close to Novoyehorivka (15km southwest of Svatove), which has led to a lower in Russian exercise on this line.[26] A Russian milblogger additionally claimed that Russian forces attacked close to Kyslivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk).[27]
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces carried out unsuccessful offensive operations close to Kreminna on September 17. The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that Russian troops of the Central Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian assaults close to Dibrova, Torske (13km west of Kreminna), and within the Serebryanske forest space.[28]
Russian Subordinate Major Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian goal: Seize the whole thing of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Ukrainian forces liberated Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and made advances elsewhere within the Bakhmut route on September 17. Ukrainian Jap Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Ilya Yevlash said that Ukrainian forces liberated Klishchiivka, and Ukrainian forces launched a number of movies from Klishchiivka in the course of the day whereby they said that that they had liberated the settlement.[29] The Ukrainian bulletins of the liberation present Ukrainian forces working freely within the settlement.[30] Russian milbloggers denied that Ukrainian forces liberated Klishchiivka and claimed that Ukrainian forces solely management the southern and central elements of the settlement.[31] One other milblogger acknowledged that Russian forces have entrenched themselves close to the railway east and northeast of Klishchiivka however that they don’t keep positions within the settlement itself.[32] Footage printed on September 17 reveals Ukrainian forces firing on Russian forces on the outskirts of Klishchiivka and forcing them to retreat.[33] Extra geolocated footage printed on September 16 signifies that Ukrainian forces made positive aspects east of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut).[34] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled a number of Ukrainian assaults on Bakhmut’s northern flank, and that preventing is ongoing close to Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut), which they claimed is a contested ”grey zone.”[35]
Russian forces counterattacked within the Bakhmut space on September 17 however didn’t make any confirmed positive aspects. The Ukrainian Normal Workers reported that Ukrainian forces repelled 5 Russian assaults close to Klishchiivka and Bila Hora (14km southwest of Bakhmut) and repelled Russian counterattacks close to Andriivka and Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are counterattacking close to Klishchiivka and unsuccessfully tried to push Ukrainian forces out of positions close to Bohdanivka (7km northwest of Bakhmut).[37] Yevlash said that Russian forces at present have 52,000 personnel deployed to the Bakhmut route.[38]
Ukrainian forces carried out restricted floor assaults alongside the Avdiivka-Donetsk Metropolis entrance on September 17 and superior. Geolocated footage printed on September 16 signifies that Ukrainian forces had made additional positive aspects east of Krasnohorivka (22km southwest of Avdiivka).[39] The Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD) claimed that parts of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian assaults close to Marinka (27km southwest of Avdiivka).[40]
Russian forces continued restricted offensive operations alongside the Avdiivka-Donetsk Metropolis entrance on September 17 however didn’t make any confirmed positive aspects. The Ukrainian Normal Workers reported that Russian forces carried out unsuccessful offensive actions close to Avdiivka, Sieverne (11km southwest of Avdiivka), and Marinka.[41] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun said that Russian forces often conduct 10 to fifteen assaults close to Marinka on daily basis with motorized rifle items in addition to mixed ”Storm” and ”Storm-Z” items.[42] A Russian information aggregator claimed that Russian forces attacked south of Avdiivka and close to Opytne (4km south of Avdiivka) on September 16.[43]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian goal: Keep frontline positions and safe rear areas towards Ukrainian strikes)
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations within the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast space on September 17 however didn’t advance. Russian sources, together with the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces continued assaults alongside the Novodonetske-Novomayorske line (13-19km southeast of Velyka Novosilka), close to Staromayorske (10km south of Velyka Novosilka), and close to Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[44] A number of Russian sources reported that preventing on this sector has largely assumed a positional nature and claimed that some Ukrainian items are rotating on this space.[45]
Russian forces carried out counterattacks within the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast space on September 17 and reportedly superior. The Ukrainian Normal Workers reported that Russian forces carried out unsuccessful offensive operations close to Novodarivka (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Rivnopil (10km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked in direction of Urozhaine (10km south of Velyka Novosilka), and one other Russian supply claimed that Russian forces knocked Ukrainian troops out of unspecified positions close to Pryyutne.[47] One Russian milblogger famous that parts of the “Vostok” Battalion and Donetsk Individuals’s Republic (DNR) “Kaskad” formation are defending towards Ukrainian assaults on this sector and inflicting excessive losses on Ukrainian troops.[48] Russian milbloggers claimed that parts of the thirty ninth Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Military Corps, Jap Army District), Aerospace Forces (VKS), thirty sixth Mixed Arms Military (Jap Army District), and fortieth Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are engaged within the space.[49]
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 17 and didn’t make any confirmed positive aspects. Ukrainian navy sources reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations within the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) route and have been profitable in unspecified areas.[50] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian assault close to Robotyne (13km south of Orikhiv).[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that heavy preventing continued alongside the Robotyne-Verbove line, notably within the route of Novoprokopivka (simply south of Robotyne).[52] One Russian supply claimed that Ukrainian forces are utilizing teams of two to a few individuals to attempt to advance south of Robotyne.[53]
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces carried out restricted counterattacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 17. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are counterattacking close to Robotyne and from positions close to Novoprokopivka and Kopani (12km southwest of Orikhiv).[54] Russian sources claimed that parts of the seventh Guards Mountain Air Assault (VDV) Division, notably the 247th VDV Regiment, are defending south of Orikhiv.[55]
Russian sources claimed that Ukraine focused occupied Crimea with drones on September 17. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian air defenses downed 4 Ukrainian drones over the northwestern and jap coasts of Crimea early within the morning on September 17.[56] A distinguished Russian milblogger claimed that Ukraine launched a complete of six drones at Crimea and that the Russian “Medvedi“ (Bears) Non-public Army Firm (PMC) detected the drones whereas the thirty first Air Protection Division (4th Air Power and Air Protection Military, Southern Army District) shot down three drones close to Portove and Cape Tarkhankut.[57] One Russian supply posted a picture reportedly of a downed drone close to an oil depot within the space of Feodosia.[58]
Russian Mobilization and Power Technology Efforts (Russian goal: Broaden fight energy with out conducting basic mobilization)
Latest Russian claims that small contingents of former Wagner Group personnel are returning to battle in Ukraine don’t point out {that a} totally reconstituted Wagner preventing power will return to Ukraine anytime quickly if ever. Russian milbloggers, together with a Wagner-affiliated Russian milblogger, claimed on September 17 {that a} small variety of fighters from the third Platoon of Wagner’s 1st Assault Detachment assembled an unbiased group and returned to the entrance in Ukraine.[59] A Russian milblogger claiming to be affiliated with Wagner claimed that the fighters probably signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Protection (MoD).[60] It’s potential {that a} small variety of Wagner personnel have signed Russian MoD contracts as a part of the Russian MoD’s efforts to combine Wagner personnel into typical Russian formations amid the continued uncertainty of Wagner’s future domestically and overseas.[61] One other Russian milblogger claimed on September 16 that ”Wagner veterans” are preventing close to Klishchiivka in Donetsk Oblast.[62] ISW continues to evaluate that it’s unlikely that the Kremlin will restore Wagner as a large-scale quasi-independent group beneath a unified command unbiased of the Kremlin or Russian MoD, which is the one probably kind by which Wagner personnel would current a major menace to the Ukrainian navy once more.[63]
Forbes estimated on September 16 that the Russian authorities has spent round $167.3 billion on the warfare in Ukraine from February 2022 to August 2023, primarily based on information from the Ukrainian Normal Workers.[64] Forbes reported that the Russian authorities has spent $51.3 billion on materiel for navy operations, $35.1 billion on navy salaries, $46.6 billion on compensation for the households of deceased or wounded Russian servicemen, and $34 billion on destroyed gear.[65] Forbes estimated that the Russian authorities spends $300 million per day on the warfare in Ukraine.[66]
Russian authorities reportedly proceed efforts to forcibly mobilize residents of occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Army Administration Head Artem Lysohor said on September 17 that Russian authorities offered navy summonses to males residing in Starobilsk Raion, occupied Luhansk Oblast.[67] Lysohor said that Russian authorities even gave summonses to males who don’t have Russian passports in Pidhorivka, Starobilsk Raion.[68]
Actions in Russian-occupied areas (Russian goal: Consolidate administrative management of annexed areas; forcibly combine Ukrainian residents into Russian sociocultural, financial, navy, and governance techniques)
Russian occupation administrations proceed to forcibly deport Ukrainian kids to Russia and erase Ukrainian cultural id. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration said on September 17 that occupation officers despatched schoolchildren between the ages of 9 and 17 to Moscow for the “Tradition Map 4+85” all-Russian cultural and schooling trade program.[69] The Kherson Oblast occupation administration reportedly plans to ship hundreds of native kids to Moscow and St. Petersburg for related packages by the top of 2023.[70] Occupation authorities in Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhia oblasts may also ship an unspecified variety of native kids to Russia for these packages.[71] Russian Tradition Minister Olga Lyubimova reportedly said that a minimum of 10,000 college kids from the occupied territories will participate within the “Tradition Map 4+85” program in 2023 and get “acquainted with the wealthy cultural historical past of our [Russia].”[72] These packages are probably a part of Russia’s wider marketing campaign to forcibly deport Ukrainian kids to Russia and forcibly assimilate them into the Russian sociocultural sphere.
The Russian Republic of Mordovia continues to broaden its patronage community in occupied Kherson Oblast. Kherson Oblast occupation administration head Vladimir Saldo said on September 17 that he met with Republic of Mordovia Head Artyom Zdunov to debate Mordovia’s current infrastructure tasks in occupied Kherson Oblast, together with the renovation and building of public infrastructure and housing.[73] Saldo claimed that Zdunov additionally agreed to construct a resort in occupied Kherson Oblast.[74]
Important exercise in Belarus (Russian efforts to extend its navy presence in Belarus and additional combine Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group exercise in Belarus)
Belarusian and Russian milbloggers posted footage on September 17 reportedly exhibiting Wagner Group instructors conducting joint drills with the Belarusian Ministry of Inner Affairs.[75]
ISW will proceed to report each day noticed Russian and Belarusian navy exercise in Belarus as a part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to extend their management over Belarus and different Russian actions in Belarus.
Be aware: ISW doesn’t obtain any categorised materials from any supply, makes use of solely publicly obtainable data, and attracts extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media in addition to commercially obtainable satellite tv for pc imagery and different geospatial information as the premise for these experiences. References to all sources used are supplied within the endnotes of every replace.
[1] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/5106; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/5099
[2] https://twitter.com/hromadske/standing/1703454113223086466?s=46&t=_XWt9fOAD77gQx8flqZr2A ; https://suspilne dot media/571377-ukrainski-vijskovi-zvilnili-klisiivku-poblizu-bahmuta-na-doneccini/; https://twitter.com/ZelenskyyUa/standing/1703474879314407676
[3] https://t.me/instructorRagnar/345; https://x.com/1zoner4/standing/1703016989751418913?s=20; https://x.com/klinger66/standing/1703209325538263519?s=20; https://twitter.com/PuenteUribarri/standing/1703330571940765984
[4] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UA98NL7KKvSP35kuoJMYPZhtGmofNTCeCFkMBTPMRoV9K4o3fruEW3iCte7VVGeWl ; https://t.me/kpszsu/5278
[5] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0UA98NL7KKvSP35kuoJMYPZhtGmofNTCeCFkMBTPMRoV9K4o3fruEW3iCte7VVGeWl ; https://t.me/kpszsu/5278; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/799; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/09/17/vnochi-nashi-syly-ppo-znyshhyly-12-povitryanyh-czilej-voroga/
[6] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/803
[7] https://t.me/mod_russia/30551; https://t.me/rybar/51983 ; https://t.me/rybar/51969 https://t.me/synegubov/7071
[8] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/18769281
[9] https://tass dot ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/18769281; https://t.me/milinfolive/106540
[10] https://isw.pub/UkrWar091623
[11] Safety Council Committee established pursuant to decision 1718 (2006) | United Nations Safety Council
[12] https://apnews.com/article/south-korea-yoon-putin-kim-russia-8247223881457da191d069547e1cc762
[13] https://apnews.com/article/south-korea-yoon-putin-kim-russia-8247223881457da191d069547e1cc762 ; https://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-12522651/Inside-S-Korean-factory-key-Ukraine.html?ITO=applenews-us
[14] https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-war-drives-rapid-growth-in-south-koreas-arms-exports-11675345212
[15] https://apnews.com/article/south-korea-yoon-putin-kim-russia-8247223881457da191d069547e1cc762 ; https://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-12522651/Inside-S-Korean-factory-key-Ukraine.html?ITO=applenews-us
[16] https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/3582 ; https://t.me/grey_zone/20625 ; https://t.me/rybar/51962 https://t.me/africaintel/5728; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/97667; https://t.me/milinfolive/106482 https://t.me/grey_zone/20624 ; https://t.me/genshtab24/33180 https://t.me/milinfolive/106503
[17] https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/21484 ; https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/21488 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/97750 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/3582 ; https://t.me/grey_zone/20625 ; https://t.me/rybar/51962 https://t.me/africaintel/5728; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/97667; https://t.me/milinfolive/106482 https://t.me/grey_zone/20624 ; https://t.me/genshtab24/33180 https://t.me/milinfolive/106503
[18] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-niger-burkina-faso-sign-sahel-security-pact-2023-09-16/
[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar091623 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar091523 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar091323 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar090123 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar090823 ; https://t.me/grey_zone/20625 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/3582
[20] https://censor dot web/ua/information/3443720/ukrayinska_rozvidka_pidtverdjuye_tyajkyyi_stan_kadyrova_chechenski_emigranty_povidomlyayut_scho_vin ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/3580 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/41851 ; https://t.me/vchkogpu/41853
[21] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/3901
[22] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0USXFnjKWahjG83eGrYBQWJdN9kb74TTkbrdLDXnW4szHcLgzzzEcwMfvvCkUPbQ7l
[23] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/12827
[24] https://t.me/karymat/3791; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/4018
[25] https://t.me/karymat/3791; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/4018
[26] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/09/17/mayemo-uspihy-na-bahmutskomu-napryamku-illya-yevlash/
[27] https://t.me/wargonzo/15081
[28] https://t.me/mod_russia/30550; https://t.me/mod_russia/30546
[29] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/5105 ; https://twitter.com/hromadske/standing/1703454113223086466?s=46&t=_XWt9fOAD77gQx8flqZr2A ; https://suspilne dot media/571377-ukrainski-vijskovi-zvilnili-klisiivku-poblizu-bahmuta-na-doneccini/ ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/5099
[30] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/5105 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/5099 ;
[31] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/97778 ; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/38020
[32] https://t.me/rusich_army/10891
[33] https://twitter.com/region776/standing/1703413425928552758
[34] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/standing/1703123756749627748; https://t.me/aerobomber/164; https://twitter.com/GermanObserver1/standing/1703071748986466776
[35] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/38020 ; https://t.me/rybar/51969 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/15094
[36] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NWQ9ffcQ22NyMqqcARK2ZXRhjgG7PWnyyc5tWWQteUT6RHoJdh1MQ7ypJB4vcARGl ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0USXFnjKWahjG83eGrYBQWJdN9kb74TTkbrdLDXnW4szHcLgzzzEcwMfvvCkUPbQ7l
[37] https://t.me/wargonzo/15081 ; https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/38020
[38] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/09/17/vtraty-protyvnyka-podekudy-v-7-8-raziv-perevyshhuyut-nashi-illya-yevlash/
[39] https://twitter.com/lost_warinua/standing/1703115030835728755
[40] https://t.me/mod_russia/30550
[41] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02NWQ9ffcQ22NyMqqcARK2ZXRhjgG7PWnyyc5tWWQteUT6RHoJdh1MQ7ypJB4vcARGl ; https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0USXFnjKWahjG83eGrYBQWJdN9kb74TTkbrdLDXnW4szHcLgzzzEcwMfvvCkUPbQ7l
[42] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/09/17/ukrayinski-vijskovi-vidbyvayut-vsi-ataky-voroga-i-zavdayut-jomu-znachnyh-vtrat-oleksandr-shtupun/
[43] https://t.me/readovkanews/66113
[44] https://t.me/mod_russia/30550; https://t.me/mod_russia/30535; https://t.me/rybar/51969; https://t.me/rybar/51988
[45] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/38020; https://t.me/batalyon_vostok/187 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/53222; https://t.me/voin_dv/4965; https://t.me/rybar/51988
[46] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0USXFnjKWahjG83eGrYBQWJdN9kb74TTkbrdLDXnW4szHcLgzzzEcwMfvvCkUPbQ7l
[47] https://t.me/readovkanews/66113; https://t.me/wargonzo/15081
[48] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/50570
[49] https://t.me/voin_dv/4964 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/97741; https://t.me/wargonzo/15081; https://t.me/voin_dv/4965
[50] https://www.fb.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0USXFnjKWahjG83eGrYBQWJdN9kb74TTkbrdLDXnW4szHcLgzzzEcwMfvvCkUPbQ7l; https://www.fb.com/PresscentrTavria/posts/pfbid02SYSLTDeXMQwe7GkxMrmzoNGQrRmMoXQw8hNuGfBAFfSeYtnLVMAD8coPut5zRYgml; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2023/09/17/ukrayinski-vijskovi-vidbyvayut-vsi-ataky-voroga-i-zavdayut-jomu-znachnyh-vtrat-oleksandr-shtupun/
[51] https://t.me/mod_russia/30550
[52] https://t.me/wargonzo/15081; https://t.me/batalyon15/2923; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/53196
[53] https://t.me/rusich_army/10883
[54] https://t.me/russkiy_opolchenec/38020; https://t.me/readovkanews/66113
[55] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/53196; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/50570
[56] https://t.me/mod_russia/30542 ; https://t.me/multi_XAM/792; https://t.me/rybar/51975
[57] https://t.me/rybar/51987
[58] https://t.me/milinfolive/106547
[59] https://t.me/orchestra_w/9053 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/97772 ; https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/3585
[60] https://t.me/prigozhin_2023_tg/3585
[61] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-9-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2023 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar080923
[62] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/53197
[63] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082423
[64] https://forbes dot ua/war-in-ukraine/za-pivtora-roku-rosiya-vitratila-na-viynu-z-ukrainoyu-blizko-1673-mlrd-z-nikh-tilki-tekhniki-na-ponad-34-mlrd-rozrakhunki-forbes-16092023-16050
[65] https://forbes dot ua/war-in-ukraine/za-pivtora-roku-rosiya-vitratila-na-viynu-z-ukrainoyu-blizko-1673-mlrd-z-nikh-tilki-tekhniki-na-ponad-34-mlrd-rozrakhunki-forbes-16092023-16050
[66] https://forbes dot ua/war-in-ukraine/za-pivtora-roku-rosiya-vitratila-na-viynu-z-ukrainoyu-blizko-1673-mlrd-z-nikh-tilki-tekhniki-na-ponad-34-mlrd-rozrakhunki-forbes-16092023-16050
[67] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/13714
[68] https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/13714
[69] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080923
[70] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080923
[71] https://isw.pub/UkrWar080923
[72] https://zp-news dot ru/tradition/2023/03/24/104644.html ; https://portal-kultura dot ru/articles/information/352540-startovala-programma-kulturnaya-karta-4-85-dlya-detey-iz-novykh-regionov/
[73] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/1204
[74] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/1204
[75] https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/21481 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/29265